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Título: Reformulación Visual Positiva: Un ensayo controlado aleatorizado 
utilizando imágenes visuales para disminuir la intensidad de experiencias 
negativas y regular emociones en adultos sanos. 
Resumen: Se exploran los resultados de la reformulación visual positiva 
(RVP), una intervención en la que imágenes de memorias abiertas y expe-
riencias negativas son reformuladas visualmente para formar nuevas narra-
tivas positivas. El estudio plantea la hipótesis de que la RVP conduciría a 
mejoras en el afecto positivo y negativo, autoeficacia e intensidad y resolu-
ción percibidas de experiencias negativas. 62 adultos sanos fueron aleatori-
zados a condiciones de RVP o control. Se hallaron mejoras para el grupo 
experimental en niveles de afecto positivo, así como intensidad percibida y 
resolución de la experiencia negativa inmediatamente después de comple-
tar la actividad de RVP. Estos hallazgos ponen de relieve el potencial de la 
RVP para mejorar la regulación emocional cuando se activan emociones 
negativas. 
A las dos semanas se identificaron mejoras en ambas condiciones. Esto su-
giere que, con el tiempo, la exposición viso-sensorial creada al extraer un 
recuerdo negativo también puede conducir a mejoría. 
El estudio hace hincapié en el potencial de la RVP para regular emociones 
y difuminar la intensidad de un recuerdo abierto mediante la transforma-
ción visual de un momento de máxima intensidad perceptual. Se reco-
miendan estudios que exploren la efectividad de la RVP para cambiar per-
cepciones negativas en poblaciones clínicas y no clínicas. 
Palabras clave: Imágenes dibujadas, reformulación, recuerdos negativos, 
regulación emocional. 
  Abstract: This research explores the outcome of positive visual reframing 
(PVR), a single session intervention where drawn images of negative expe-
riences and open memories were redrawn and visually reframed to form 
new positive narratives. The study hypothesised that PVR would lead to 
improvements to positive and negative affect, self-efficacy and the per-
ceived intensity and perceived resolution of a selected negative experience. 
Healthy adults (n = 62) were randomly assigned to the PVR or control 
condition. For the experimental group, statistical significance was identi-
fied for positive affect and the perceived intensity and resolution of the 
negative experience immediately following the PVR activity. Self-efficacy 
was marginally significant. The findings highlight the potential of positive 
visual reframing to enhance emotional regulation when negative emotions 
are triggered. At two weeks‟ post-intervention, improvements were identi-
fied in both conditions. This suggests that over time, the visual and senso-
ry exposure created by drawing a negative memory may also lead to posi-
tive gains. The study emphasises the potential of PVR to regulate emo-
tions and defuse the intensity of negative or open memories by visually 
transforming a moment of peak perceptual intensity. Future studies ex-
ploring the effectiveness of positive visual reframing to shift negative emo-
tions in clinical and non-clinical populations are recommended. 
Keywords: Drawn imagery, reframing, negative experiences, open 
memory, emotional regulation. 
 
Introduction 
 
Negative experiences are something we all share and general-
ly arise as a consequence of emotionally charged social inter-
actions and events (John & Gross, 2004). When attempts to 
understand and explain the meaning of a negative experience 
are successful, we generally find closure and move on (Wil-
son, & Gilbert, 2008). Otherwise, the experience remains 
„open‟ and is easily triggered by reminiscent experiences and 
emotional and visual cues (Lazarus, 1991). Described collo-
quially as „unfinished business‟ (Beike, & Writh-Beaumont, 
2005), open memories are problematic for a variety of rea-
sons. For one, open memories contain high levels of emo-
tional detail, emotional significance, and information, which 
when combined greatly increases the likelihood the memory 
will be maintained (Conway et al., 1994; Peeters, & Cza-
pinski, 1990). Because negative memories are perceived as 
self-relevant, they lead to intensified affective reactions upon 
recall (Frijda, 1988) and challenge effective emotional analy-
sis (Metcalfe, & Mischel, 1999). As these memories contain 
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more complex and less coherent narratives than closed or 
positive memories (Bohanek, Fivush, & Walker, 2005), the 
negative uncertainty of open memories further enhances 
negative emotions (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009) and 
perpetuate questioning about „why‟ the experience happened 
(Abele, 1985). Finally, because open memories are so acces-
sible they make substantial contributions to current feelings 
and decision-making (Beike, & Writh-Beaumont, 2005). As 
humans are highly motivated to make sense of themselves 
and their experiences, these poorly understood negative 
memories are also perceived as a source of threat (Wilson & 
Gilbert, 2008). This means when triggered, open memories 
receive priority cognitive attention (Allport & Postman, 
1946; Malle & Knobe, 1997) and are automatically selected 
for processing and appraisal at the expense of working 
memory performance (Klein & Boals, 2001; Curci Lanciano, 
Soleti, & Rimé, 2013).  
To respond to the demands of a difficult emotion, open 
memories activate a range of emotional-regulation strategies 
(Ochsner, & Gross, 2005).  Cognitive reappraisal, for exam-
ple, is an adaptive regulation process, whereby reframing an 
event is used to diminish emotional impact and shift a nega-
tive trajectory of response (John, & Gross, 2004; Lazarus, & 
Alfert, 1964). Demonstrating the benefits of adaptive emo-
tional regulation strategies, frequent use of cognitive reap-
praisal is related to higher levels of positive and lower levels 
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of negative affect and is positively related to mood repair. 
Habitual reappraisers also display high self-esteem, high op-
timism and fewer depressive tendencies (John, & Gross, 
2004). Like cognitive reappraisal, positive reframing is a 
regulatory process of perceiving an experience or event pre-
viously regarded as negative within a new context or frame-
work (Lambert et al., 2009). Although both cognitive reap-
praisal and positive reframing are generally understood as 
outcomes of disposition and personality traits (Packenham, 
& Cox, 2008; Lambert et al., 2009), researchers argue there is 
promised to be had by interventions that can highlight func-
tional emotional regulation strategies (Ehring, Tuschen-
Caffier, Schnulle, et al., 2010).  
Whereas positively reinterpreting negative experiences 
provides an adaptive response that boosts coping resources 
(Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, & Schkade 2005), intervention stud-
ies exploring positive reframing of open memories have had 
limited empirical attention. Instead, research on open 
memory closure has largely focused on emotional venting 
through expressive writing paradigms (Pennebaker, 1993). 
An important exception to this somewhat negatively focused 
strategy is Watkins, Cruz, Holben, and Kolts (2008) who 
demonstrate the positive impact of grateful written pro-
cessing on open memory closure.  
Despite a research emphasis on expressive writing for 
negative memory closure, it is important to note that memo-
ries and experiences are generally summarised as visual imag-
es (Conway, 2009; Holmes & Mathews, 2010) and that nega-
tive and traumatic memories are encoded as sensory percep-
tions (van der Kolk & van der Hart, 1995). Subsequently, as 
emotional systems both respond to and store information us-
ing sensory-based formats, these systems may actually be less 
responsive to non-sensory based interventions that use higher 
order level conscious processing such as language and writ-
ing (Holmes & Mathews, 2010). Based on this conclusion, as 
negative open memories arise from and are recorded as visu-
al experiences, they might actually require sensory-based, (ie. 
visual) interventions to shift deeply rooted emotional re-
sponses and perceptions (Holmes, Arntz, & Smucker, 2007; 
Mathews, Ridgeway, & Holmes, 2013). Furthermore, as im-
age-based memories are considered fragile (Beike & Writh-
Beaumont, 2005), malleable (Conway, 2009; Holmes & 
Mathews, 2010) and progressively reconstructed over time 
(Torralba, & Oliva, 2003), drawn visuals might provide an 
especially synergic approach for reframing and supporting 
memory closure.  
Additional support for the viability of visual interven-
tions comes from studies that show art-making enhances 
positive mood (Bell, & Robbins, 2007; De Petrillo & Winner, 
2005). A positive mood, in turn, leads to increased levels of 
mental flexibility and creative thinking (Forgas, 1998; Isen, 
2002), facilitates cognitive processing (Taylor, 1991) and 
primes for cognitive change (Kuvaasa, & Selart, 2004). 
Therefore, given the tendency of open memories to deplete 
cognitive resources (Klein, & Boals, 2001; Curci et al., 2013), 
there is an additional argument for the mood-enhancing 
quality of visual interventions to bolster the cognitive re-
sources open memories drain. Finally, whereas meaningful 
and relevant visual cues can unconsciously activate negative 
emotional responses (Öhman, & Mineka, 2001; Folkman, 
Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis, & Gruen, 1986), visual 
cues can trigger positive emotional responses as well (Latu, 
Mast, Lammers, & Bombardi, 2013; Winkielman, Berridge, 
& Wilbarger, 2005). 
In related evidence, the effectiveness of venting negative 
experiences through drawing and writing is investigated in 
several empirical studies. Chan and Horneffer (2006) (n = 
63) for example, found that in the short term, drawing mean-
ingful negative experiences elicited stronger negative emo-
tions and was less effective in decreasing social dysfunction 
than writing about them. Contrasting findings by Pizarro 
(2004) (n = 45), which show in the short-term writing about 
trauma leads to higher levels of negative affect than drawing, 
suggests research is inconclusive in this area. However, when 
the valence of drawn imagery is shifted from negative to pos-
itive or benign, interesting shifts arise. Using positive-themed 
drawn imagery to distract attention away from a negatively 
induced mood was found more effective than using drawn 
imagery to vent negative feelings (Dalebroux, Goldstein, & 
Winner, 2008; Drake & Winner, 2012). This suggests posi-
tive-focused drawing may have benefits over negative-
focused drawing. However, neither venting nor positive dis-
traction was sufficiently effective, in the short term, to re-
duce the negative arousal created by either an induced nega-
tive mood (De Petrillio & Winner, 2005) or an authentic 
open memory (Dalebroux et al., 2008). Subsequently, defus-
ing negative arousal may require a more meaningful strategy 
than venting or positive distraction currently provide. Finally, 
it is plausible that like expressive writing, negative arousal in 
the short-term is a necessary requirement of longer-term 
positive gain (Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1988). 
Empirical studies exploring the use of drawn visual im-
agery to tackle negative experiences are limited but include 
Mercer, Warson, and Zhao (2010), who used a single group 
(N=10), test-re-test design and a range of intervention tech-
niques to explore the impact of drawing benign versions of 
work-related stress. Findings showed that while positive af-
fect remained unchanged, anxiety and negative affect de-
creased. In contrast, Holmes and Mathews (2010) found that 
imagining benign, ambiguous outcomes to a negative experi-
ence was ineffective at decreasing anxiety, yet was later rem-
edied when participants imagined unambiguously positive 
resolutions. In a more recent study, healthcare professionals 
(n = 35) took part in a multi-levelled intervention using 
drawn imagery to de-stress (Huss & Sarid, 2014). Measures 
indicated that between pre and post-intervention, subjective 
levels of discomfort were halved. The authors argue their 
finding lends support to links between the transformation of 
imagery and the transformation of subjective states. They 
further propose that image-transformation may lead to per-
ceived control and provide a trigger for a more relaxed emo-
tional state. Although not specifically highlighted, like Mercer 
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et al. (2010) it is also plausible that as based on peak and end 
theory (Fredrickson, 2000), visually defusing a moment of 
peak intensity led to new, less negative perceptions of the 
experience‟s ending.  While each of these studies has their 
limitations (lack of control group or randomisation, small 
sample sizes, or the challenge of extracting key impacts from 
a multi-intervention focus), for the current research they 
provide an important springboard for exploration. At pre-
sent, drawn image-based interventions are an underexplored 
area of quantitative investigation, particularly within non-
clinical populations and currently lack representation in in-
tervention-led fields such as positive psychology.  
To address this gap in the literature, the present study 
explored the impact of Positive Visual Reframing (PVR) – de-
scribed here as a functional emotional regulation strategy 
that uses drawn visual imagery to positively reframe and de-
fuse negative emotional experiences. The study hypothesised 
that after producing an image of an open memory or nega-
tive emotional experience, healthy adults who used drawn 
visual imagery to positively reframe their memory‟s narrative 
would have higher scores on positive affect, self-efficacy and 
perceived resolution and lower scores on negative affect and 
the perceived intensity of the experience than a control 
group who undertook a neutral drawing activity. 
 
Method 
 
Design 
 
Due to a shortfall of empirical studies on drawn image-
based interventions, the present research was designed as a 
randomised control trial to explore between-group and with-
in-group outcomes. The research was developed as a practi-
cal and deliverable intervention through which the impact of 
a single independent variable (positive visual reframing) 
could be assessed as a stand-alone activity. The dependent 
variables, positive and negative affect and self-efficacy were 
selected as clear indicators of emotional regulation and posi-
tive psychological gain. Ordinal scales measuring the intensi-
ty and resolution of the negative experience were included to 
add a richer nuance to the findings of the intervention and 
provide clear data on perceptual shifts. Demographics, in-
cluding the age of the negative experience, were also includ-
ed in the design.  
 
Participants 
 
Participants were healthy adult volunteers (n = 62) of 
working age living in the UK. A total of 46 females and 14 
males took part in the study. Two participants did not identi-
fy their gender. See Consort Flow Diagram (fig. 1) and base-
line characteristics (table 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Flow diagram of the study. 
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Over a three-month time-frame, participants were re-
cruited widely by the principal investigator through Face-
book, LinkedIn shares, and call-outs for volunteers in vari-
ous organisational, educational and vocational newsletters. A 
sample size of 60+ participants was selected as, accepting an 
alpha risk of 0.05 and a beta risk of 0.2 in a two-sided test. 
At least 29 subjects were needed to recognise as statistically 
significant a difference greater than or equal to 0.5 standard 
deviations, assuming a correlation coefficient between the in-
itial and final measurement of r = 0.8. All participants re-
ceived an introductory letter and a consent form prior to tak-
ing part in the study. 
A copy of a sealed, coded and shuffled intervention pack, 
randomly allocating subjects to the experimental or control 
condition was distributed to participants. Each pack con-
tained written instructions, blank white A4 paper, study 
measures for Time-1-3 and Time-4 (two weeks‟ post-
intervention) and a postage-paid return envelope for return-
ing the data. The two-week follow-up time frame was select-
ed as representative of when short-term intervention benefits 
generally wane (Semmer, 2008). The study was double-
blinded as neither the researcher nor the participants knew 
which packs participants would receive. The design of the 
control and experimental activities aimed to encourage both 
groups to view their activity as the main focus of the study. 
To counter the influence of participant bias or priming, par-
ticipants worked independently and self-selected a time and 
location to complete the study. 
 
Measures  
 
The healthiness of subsects to take part in the study was 
assessed using Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale 
(WEMWB) (Tennant et al., 2007). The WEMWB is a vali-
dated, ordinal scale measuring mental health across 14 de-
scriptive phrases. For the purposes of this study, well-being 
was defined as “the balance between an individual‟s resource 
pool and the challenges faced” (p. 230, Dodge, Daley, Huy-
ton, & Saunders, 2012). 
Positive and negative affect were measured using the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) (Watson, & 
Clark, 1988). Positive affect is described as a high state of 
concentration, energy, and pleasurable engagement while 
negative affect is described an aversive mood state of un-
pleasurable engagement and distress (Watson, & Clark, 
1998).  
Self-efficacy was measured using the Generalized Self-
Efficacy Scale (GSE) (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995). Self-
efficacy is concerned with an individual‟s perceptual belief in 
their own capabilities and influences how people think, feel 
and behave (Bandura, 1977).  
Ordinal scales assessing perceived competence and per-
ceived resolution were based on Beike and Writh-Beaumont 
(2005) and Watkins et al. (2008). Perceived intensity of the 
negative experience was assessed using a 9-point Likert scale. 
Responses ranged from 1 (very strong negative effect) to 9 
(very strong positive effect). Participants circled one re-
sponse to describe the current intensity of their selected ex-
perience or challenge. Perceived resolution of the negative 
experience was assessed using a 7-point Likert scale. Re-
sponses ranged from -3 (very unresolved) to +3 (very re-
solved) based on the question, „How resolved or unresolved would 
you currently rate your feelings toward this memory or experience?’  
 
Procedure 
 
Following written instructions, study participants com-
pleted Time-1 baseline, measures for positive and negative 
affect using the PANAS Scale (Watson & Clark, 1988), men-
tal well-being using the Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-
being Scale (WEMWB) (Tennant et al., 2007), and self-
efficacy using the General Self-Efficacy Scale (GSE) 
(Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995). Next, using a pencil and 
blank paper, participants in both conditions created an im-
age, doodle or diagram of a negative experience, open 
memory or challenge. After completing and reflecting on the 
negative image, all participants completed Time-2 measures 
for positive and negative affect, self-efficacy, ordinal scales 
on the perceived intensity and perceived resolution of their 
image‟s memory and details of the experience‟s age. 
At Time-3, the experimental group used positive visual 
reframing to positively change the narrative of their image by 
drawing over the initial pencil drawing with a black pen or 
felt-tip and making note of and including any fresh insight in 
their new image. Once complete, participants used a rubber 
to remove any unwanted traces of the original negative pen-
cil drawing, re-told themselves the new positive story in their 
mind and took a few moments to connect with any positive 
feelings created. The same measures used at Time-2 were 
then completed for Time-3. In the control group, partici-
pants covered a fresh sheet of blank A4 paper with triangles 
as a neutral, image-based activity, and then went on to com-
plete the Time-3 repeat-measures. 
After completing the intervention, all participants were 
instructed to take a photograph of their final image and set it 
as their mobile phone‟s background for a period of two 
weeks. This activity was selected as positive replay maintains 
positive emotions (Lyubomirsky, Sousa & Dickerhoof, 
2006).  Intervention packs were returned in postage-paid en-
velopes minus the drawings. These were purposefully ex-
cluded from the study to encourage participant willingness to 
create meaningful personal narratives and pre-empt any anx-
ieties that drawings might be interpreted, or artistry judged. 
Two weeks after completing the intervention, written in-
structions requested participants in all conditions to mentally 
recall the original negative experience before completing and 
returning via post a final set of Time-4 repeat-measures. Up-
on receipt of the measures, participants received a study-
debriefing sheet including a copy of the PVR instructions for 
control group volunteers. 
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Data analysis 
 
Baseline information was compared between groups us-
ing Chi Squared tests and t-tests. T-tests were also used to 
carry bivariate comparisons between the two groups at 
Times-2, 3 and 4. As the research included between-group 
factors and within group factors with repeated measures 
across two conditions, a mixed ANOVA was carried out 
with longitudinal data. Here one independent variable (posi-
tive visual reframing or control conditions) and four de-
pendent variables (positive and negative affect, and per-
ceived intensity and resolution, self-efficacy) were measured 
at 3 and 4-time points to compare interaction effects be-
tween the control and experimental condition.  
 
Results 
 
Table one shows Time-1 baseline characteristics for the ex-
perimental and control group. No baseline differences were 
detected for gender or any of the measured outcomes. Fig-
ure 2 and 3 show bivariate comparisons of experimental and 
control subjects at Time-2 (immediately after drawing the 
negative image), Time-3 (directly after completing the posi-
tive reframing activity or control activity), and Time-4 (two 
weeks‟ post-intervention). As it can be seen, there was a cu-
bic evolution in all variables with three follow-ups and quad-
ratic for those gathered at times-2, 3 and 4. Table 2 shows 
mean comparisons between experimental groups for all out-
comes measured. Statistical significant differences to positive 
and negative affect, as well as the intensity of the negative 
experience and the perceived resolution of negative experi-
ence, happened only after completing the positive reframing 
activity at Time-3. In this time point, the experimental group 
had marginally significant higher self-efficacy levels. 
 
Table 1. Gender composition of the sample and baseline psychometric scores by group. 
 Experimental (n = 31) Control (n = 31)   
 N % N % Statistical significance Effect size 
Gender* 25 81 22 75 2 = 1.348, p = .246 OR = .63, 95% 
CI = 1.88-2.107 
 Mean Mean rank Mean Mean rank   
Distance from negative experience** 4.71 29.84 5.19 33.16   
 M SD M SD   
Warwick Mental Well-being 47.26 8.05 47.53 8.24 t = -.132, p = .895 d = -.033 
General Self-efficacy 27.81 2.47 26.74 5.43 t = .994, p = .324 d = .253 
PANAS positive affect 30.90 8.40 31.00 7.08 t = -.048, p = .962 d = -.013 
PANAS negative affect 18.65 7.48 20.17 6.49 t = -.843, p = .403 d = -.217 
*Gender is expressed as the number and percentage of females within each group. 
** Age of the negative experience was operationalized as follows: 1, one week or more, 2, one month or more, 3, six months or more, 4 one year or more, 5, 
two years or more, 6, five years or more, 7, ten years or more. 
 
Table 2. Bivariate mean comparisons of psychometric measures along the two follow-up weeks. 
  T2  Sig.   T3  Sig.   T4  Sig.   
  M SD t p d M SD t p d M SD t p d 
Self-efficacy Experimental 
Control 
23.61 
23.00 
5.88 
6.49 
.390 .698 .098 28.74 
26.16 
4.53 
6.47 
1.820 .074 .46 28.79 
27.30 
3.97 
5.02 
1.242 .220 .33 
PANAS positive affect 
 
Experimental 
Control 
18.77 
19.71 
7.68 
6.62 
-.519 .606 -.13 27.63 
21.00 
8.89 
7.75 
3.108 .003 .79 31.48 
30.19 
6.59 
8.40 
.645 .521 .17 
PANAS negative affect 
 
Experimental 
Control 
24.81 
25.77 
9.92 
7.51 
-.418 .677 -.11 15.10 
19.06 
7.33 
7.00 
-2.161 .035 -.55 15.38 
17.48 
5.07 
5.91 
-1.433 .158 -.38 
Intensity of negative 
experience/image 
Experimental 
Control 
2.26 
2.10 
.965 
1.08 
.621 .537 .16 4.70 
2.93 
2.18 
1.08 
3.971 >.0001 1.03 3.68 
3.42 
1.44 
1.24 
.696 .489 .19 
Perceived resolution of 
negative experience 
Experimental 
Control 
2.61 
2.58 
1.76 
1.29 
.082 .935 .02 3.87 
3.00 
1.71 
1.00 
2.450 .017 .62 4.29 
3.67 
1.78 
1.62 
1.348 .183 .36 
T2: immediately after drawing the negative experience, T3: after positive visual reframing for the experimental group and a neutral drawing activity for the 
control group, T4: two weeks‟ post-intervention 
 
Repeated measures ANOVAs showed statistical signifi-
cant interactions for positive affect (sphericity assumed, F(3) 
= 5.289, p = .002, partial η2 = .094 with a cubic interaction: 
F(1) = 12.554,  p< .001, partial η2 = .198) and intensity of the 
negative experience (Greenhouse-Geisser‟s F(1.748) = 8.494, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .143 with a quadratic interaction: F(1) = 
12.327, p < .001, partial η2 = .195). For a graphic representa-
tion, please see Figures 2 and 3. 
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Figure 2. Evolution of GSE and PANNAS. 
 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of perceived intensity and resolution. 
 
Discussion 
 
This study supports the hypothesis that after producing an 
image of an unresolved negative experience or challenge, 
healthy adults who used drawn visual imagery to positively 
reframe their negative experience or open memory‟s narra-
tive (positive visual reframing) would have higher scores on posi-
tive affect, perceived resolution, and self-efficacy, and lower 
scores on negative affect and the perceived intensity of the 
negative experience than a control group who undertook a 
neutral drawing activity. This finding was consistent immedi-
ately following the intervention and at the two-weeks‟ post-
intervention follow-up.  
In both groups, drawing the negative experience led to 
significant drops in positive affect. This reflects the impact 
of a first-person perspective that generates higher levels of 
emotional detail (McIsaac & Eich, 2002), and a self-
immersed perspective (Libby & Eibach, 2002) that leads in-
dividuals to „re-live‟ emotional and self-relevant experiences 
when a negative memory is triggered (Nigro & Neisser, 
1983). Interestingly, whereas Walker, Vogl, and Thompson 
(1997) argue over time, negative emotional memories fade 
faster than positive memories, more than 50% of the partici-
pant‟s selected negative experiences were between 5-10+ 
years old. This demonstrates the enduring negative intensity 
of open memories and suggests that if it were possible for 
participants to simply „think their way‟ out of open memo-
ries, there had been ample time for this occur. The high age 
of the selected memories also emphasises the ineffectiveness 
of currently operating default strategies to provide closure to 
open memories and underscores the need for interventions 
that might more effectively support this aim.  
After drawing the negative experience, the PVR group 
demonstrated a range of beneficial outcomes indicative of 
emotional regulation. Here, departing abruptly from the con-
trol group‟s experiences, the PVR group created a clear visu-
al representation of how change might „look‟ using the sen-
sory language of the original experience.  In the same way 
that sensory information is used to signal danger and trigger 
amygdala activity (Whalen, 1998), PVR might create an 
equally expedient means of shutting down amygdala activa-
tion by visually defusing a moment of peak perceptual inten-
sity. Findings suggest PVR provides an efficient and func-
tional emotional regulation strategy when negative emotions 
are triggered. It is further suggested that in defusing a per-
ceptual threat, PVR might free cognitive space to enable 
fresh insight to arise and potentially unseat rigidly held nega-
tive perceptions. Furthermore, as drawing the negative expe-
rience involved venting and the control activity employed 
distraction, PVR demonstrated a more effective, efficient 
and potentially meaningful strategy for interrupting a nega-
tive response than either venting or distraction could offer. 
Here, the ease of access to PVR as a stopgap resource could 
also mean other less adaptive default strategies such as catas-
trophising, self-blame, and rumination (Thayer, Rossy, Ruiz-
Padial, & Johnsen, 2003; Garnefski Teerds, Kraaij, Legerstee, 
& van den Kommer, 2004) are less likely to arise or take 
hold. 
Although visually reframing a perceptual threat might 
well be credited for deactivating amygdala activity, it is un-
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likely this was the only functioning mechanism. Cohn, 
Paczynski, Jackendoff, Holcomb, and Kuperberg (2012) ar-
gue that narrative comprehension relies on meaning, a mo-
ment of peak intensity, a common theme and an ending. 
Therefore, as open memories contain complex and incoher-
ence narratives (Bohaneket al., 2005), visually reframing the 
peak action into a single and personally meaningful storyline 
may have also enabled a fresh (yet previously unavailable) 
sense of coherence (Antonovsky, 1993). Supporting the per-
ception that life is meaningful, manageable and comprehen-
sible, a newly identified sense of coherence might be credited 
for supporting the PVR group‟s self-efficacy gains. 
Whilst it could also be argued the act of art-making was 
responsible for improvements to the PVR group‟s positive 
mood (Bell & Robbins, 2007; De Petrillo & Winner, 2005), 
notably, both groups took part in a drawing activity. As such, 
like Watkins et al., (2008), study findings highlight the impact 
and benefits of a positive intervention focus. Here, the PVR 
group‟s sharp upwards spike in positive affect and reduction 
in perceived negative intensity, may have resulted from the 
faster and more intense encoding created by the reframed 
image‟s positive and visual emotional content (Lang & Brad-
ley, 2010; Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009).  It is also plausi-
ble the experimental group‟s imaginary and positive visual 
narrative set in motion a positive rumination or positive un-
certainty that could not be „undone‟ by the conscious analysis 
we apply to genuine positive experiences (Lyubomirsky, 
2006). Here, in the same way that negative uncertainty en-
hances negativity, positive uncertainly enhances positivity 
(Bar-Anan et al., 2008) and leads to lasting positive reactions 
(Wilson, Centerbar, Kermer & Gilbert, 2005). Finally, as pos-
itive replay maintains positive emotions (Lyubomirsky et al., 
2006), placing the reframed image in a visible location may 
have further supported the PVR group‟s positive gains. 
Although the impact of mood induction must be 
acknowledged, at two-weeks post- intervention, an enhanced 
mood was unlikely to account for the steady, Time-4 gains to 
perceived resolution. This may suggest that overall percep-
tion shifted in some way. Peak and End Theory demonstrates 
that perceptions of an experience‟s ending are defined by a 
single moment of peak intensity (Fredrickson, 2000). Subse-
quently, it is plausible that identifying and positively shifting 
the intensity of a negative moment may have shifted percep-
tions of the memory‟s ending and led to the increased sense 
of perceived resolution identified in the PVR group. Howev-
er, further research that involves visually re-triggering the 
negative experience (versus mentally as occurred in the pre-
sent study) would be necessary to settle this interpretation.  
An unexpected finding of the study was the Time-4 
cross-conditions improvements to positive affect, perceived 
intensity, and perceived resolution. It is arguable this finding 
reflects a general return to baseline, yet another possible ex-
planation is the beneficial yet more slowly occurring impact 
of (sensory) exposure to the negative memory (Hayes & Wil-
son, 1994; Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999) when drawing 
the original experience. Watkins (2008) argues that open 
memories remain open due to avoidance of a perceived threat, 
however, to negate avoidance evoking the object of avoid-
ance is required (Lakoff, 2004; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & 
White, 1987). Therefore, it is plausible that for both groups, 
drawn visual exposure to the negative experience side-
stepped the avoidance strategies that typically block the 
threat of emotional re-experiencing (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000). Consequently, PVR may present a covert 
strategy for facilitating the benefits of exposure (Chambless 
& Ollendick, 2001) and an expedient means of „switching 
off‟ the discomforts of this experience.  
Finally disclosing a negative experience, which despite 
inducing negative affect and emotional intensity in the short 
term (Pizarro, 2004; Pennebakker et al., 1988; Pennebakker, 
1993), may be another driving force behind the later, cross-
conditions positive gains. Overall, results suggest the subse-
quent positive emotional effects may outweigh the short-
term negative impact (Fredrickson, 1998) of drawing nega-
tive experiences and that activating negative memory may be 
an important and necessary element of positive change. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Open memories and negative experiences are easily triggered 
by emotional and visual cues (Lazarus, 1991) and once acti-
vated can lead to a range of negative outcomes (Conway et 
al., 1994; Peeters, & Czapinski, 1990; Frijda, 1988; Metcalfe, 
& Mischel, 1999; Bohanek et al., 2005; Bar-Anan, et al., 2009; 
Abele, 1985; Beike, & Writh-Beaumont, 2005; Allport, & 
Postman, 1946; Malle, & Knobe, 1997; Klein, & Boals, 2001; 
Curci et al., 2013). In response, this research presents empir-
ical evidence on the viability of visual interventions and in-
troduces positive visual reframing (PVR) as an efficient and ef-
fective, sensory-based model of emotional self-regulation 
when negative experiences are cued. Whereas previous re-
search identifies adaptive emotional regulatory strategies, 
such as cognitive reappraisal and positive reframing, as a dis-
positional response (John & Gross, 2004; Lambert et al., 
2009), this study identifies PVR as an adaptive regulatory 
strategy whose gains are neither disposition nor trait reliant. 
Although slower and less pronounced, an unexpected out-
come of the research was the positive impact of drawing the 
negative experience. This suggests that visual and sensory 
exposure to a negative experience may be an important ele-
ment of later intervention gains.  
In general, the current study may have benefitted from 
requesting participants to re-draw, versus mentally recall the 
original negative experience (as occurred) and return the 
drawings at Time-4 to ensure all participants were correctly 
and equally retriggering the negative memory. Also, whereas 
asking the PVR group to connect with positive feelings dur-
ing Time-3 was a particular element of the intervention pro-
cedure, paralleling this instruction in the control group may 
have reduced the potential impact of demand effects.  
A high level of participant attrition was also noted in the 
study. Whilst it might be argued that those who completed 
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the study were special in some way, it is more likely that the 
commitment required to independently complete the activity 
and required measurements at four separate time points was 
simply a very demanding request. Subsequent explorations of 
PVR within a contained workshop/classroom setting may 
yield a higher return ratio.  
Future research might explore the enduring quality of 
PVR to disengage and reframe negative experiences as an 
outcome of the process and/or clarify whether simply reduc-
ing the perceptual intensity of an open or negative experi-
ence is enough to generate memory closure (Beike & Writh-
Beaumont, 2005). Replication studies might explore the 
mechanisms and impact of PVR by testing cortisol levels or 
stages of amygdala arousal between activities and conditions. 
Future research exploring PVR as a clinical intervention, par-
ticularly where acute emotional regulation strategies are re-
quired, is also recommended. 
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